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In this work we revisit the known algorithms for searching for low weight codewords in linear
binary codes. We propose some improvements on them and also propose a new eﬃcient heuristic.
1. Introduction
The general problem of determining the least weight of a linear binary code is known to be
NP-Complete [1]. Even the relatively easier problem of determining whether there exists a code-
word with weight less than a given bound does not have any polynomial time algorithm known
till date. The motivation to study such a property in linear codes stems not only from the the-
oretical important and challenging open questions in coding theory but also due to its practical
ramiﬁcations in cryptography.
The general problem being NP-Complete, researchers have developed several algorithms to
quickly ﬁnd low weight codewords which are possibly close to the least weight of a given code.
Some such algorithms were proposed in [4], [5] and [3]. We brieﬂy explain these methods and then
propose some improvements to them. We also propose a new method to search for low weight
codewords. We use some of the algorithms discussed in this work to ﬁnd low weight codeword for
the linearized version of 23-step SHA-256 hash function. We hope to do detailed comparison of
all the algorithms using some standard codes in coming days.
2. Overview of Existing Algorithms
Let G be the generator matrix and H be the parity check matrix of a code C. Let the length
of a codeword in C be n and the dimension of the code be k. Then the order of G is (k × n) and
the order of H is ((n − k) × n).
The following three algorithms are available in the literature for ﬁnding low weight codewords
in a linear code.
(1) Leon’s Algorithm [4]: This algorithm uses the generator matrix of the code.
(2) Canteaut and Chabaud’s Algorithm [3]: This algorithm also uses the generator matrix of
the code. It is an improvement of the Leon’s algorithm.
(3) Stern’s Algorithm [5]: This algorithm predates the Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm. It uses
parity check matrix of the code.
Due to space restrictions, we do not describe the algorithms above. Please refer to the corre-
sponding paper for details on the particular algorithm.
3. Our Improvements to the Implementation of the Algorithms
We next describe our implementation level improvements to the algorithms described previously.
These improvements are discussed with respect to the generator matrix based approach. We
applied them for the check matrix based approach as well.
3.1. Word Oriented Approach. We use a 32-bit word oriented approach in the implementation
of all the algorithms discussed. One principal cost of the algorithms is in computing the linear
combination of rows. The step requiring linear combination of rows is implemented by a for loop
which runs as many times as the length of the column. We represent 32 columns as one 32-bit
word. With this word oriented approach, the linear combination of one row with another becomes
32 times faster because a word can be linearly combined with another word in one computer clock
cycle.
In our implementation of the Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm, the swap of a column from the
redundant set with a column from the information set is not done explicitly. Instead, only the
part of the matrix restricted to the redundant set is modiﬁed so as to reﬂect the eﬀect of the swap
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the swap. We implement all these operation over 32-bit words.
3.2. Increasing the Number of Row Combinations. We experiment with obtaining a larger
number of columns L from the redundant set such that the weight of the punctured code vanishes
on them. As this number is increased, the probability for obtaining vanishing punctured code
reduces. To be still able to obtain suﬃcient candidate row combinations of 2p rows to be tried
on the full code C, we need more rows to be linearly combined. Increasing the number of rows
to combine makes sense even when the size of the punctured code is not increased. In this latter
case, the quality of candidate row combinations may improve on the full code C.
4. Our Improvements to the Techniques
We now discuss our improvements to the techniques of the algorithms described earlier.
4.1. Using Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Attack . The algorithms discussed earlier use
two lists, each of which is prepared by linear combinations of p rows of the generator (or check)
matrix. The problem with increasing the number of rows to combine, for example p in the previous
case, is that it is not practically feasible to attempt (
k/2
p ) combinations when p is more than 3
or 4 for moderate values of k. To handle larger values of p, we incorporate a technique from [6].
The method in [6], which was earlier used in a special case in [2], is an extension of the birthday
paradox in cryptography.
This time we create four lists of linear combinations of p rows on four disjoint sets of L columns
from the redundant set. Using the tree based matching techniques of [6], we then ﬁnd matching
pairs restricted to the L columns from these four lists. Each matching pair gives us a combination
of 4p rows which vanish on a punctured code of length L. Each of these matches is a good
candidate for low weight codeword for the full code C.
We can extend the approach outlined above and create 8, 16, ...2t lists and then use a tree
based method described in [6] to ﬁnd matches in the lists. This will produce combinations of 2tp
rows, each of which vanishes on a punctured code of size L. This method can be useful when the
length of the full code C is quite large. We investigated creation of up to 4 lists in the redundant
set since the example codes we considered were not larger than length 512.
4.2. Closeness Parameterization of the Punctured Code. If the length of the punctured
code is increased without increasing the number of row combinations, the probability of obtaining a
codeword which vanishes on the punctured code is lowered. This means that some good candidate
row combinations will not be considered while examining the full code. To handle this, we do
not require the codewords to vanish completely on the punctured code, rather we look for a low
weight punctured code. We implement this by a closeness parameter. A row combination which
produces a codeword of weight less than closeness parameter in C0 is examined as a candidate for
low weight code for the full code C.
The same technique can also be used in the multi-list approach discussed in Section 4.1. In
that situation, the number of rows to combine have increased but we may not wish to lose on the
candidate row combinations which produce a very low weight in the punctured code. We use a
measure of closeness of match to keep such close matches in the candidate list for the full code.
5. A New Efficient Heuristic
The proposed heuristic works on the parity check matrix of the code. It starts with a random
ordering of the columns of the check matrix H(n−k)×n. We attempt to obtain a weight w = 2w1
using the proposed method.
We ﬁrst partition the columns of the check matrix into two sets, say X and Y . The two sets
contain n/2 columns each. We then create a list L1 by linearly combining w1 columns from
X. Each element of the list is a column vector of length (n − k). Since the number of all w1
combinations of n/2 columns is (
n/2
w1), it may not be feasible to attempt all such combinations
exhaustively. Therefore we propose to use a parameter l for the size of this list. We shortly
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SHA-256 found using Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm [3] with p = 2 and L = 10.
The 16 words of 32-bit each are listed in hexadecimal.
0-3 c0080020 a0900121 40010212 0100088a
4-7 00100800 80020818 80808d02 40082000
8-11 42000682 92002000 409a0200 10200002
12-15 00590020 28025081 44100100 10520050
describe a suitable value for this parameter. Similarly, we create a list L2 by linearly combining
w1 columns from Y . We propose to use the same size l for the list L2 as well.
If we can ﬁnd a match in the two lists L1 and L2, then we have obtained 2w1 columns whose
linear combination is zero and hence we have a codeword of weight w = 2w1. In this case the
heuristic is successful. If it is not, then we restart the search by randomizing the column ordering
again. To obtain success, we need to ensure that the two lists have some intersection. Since there
are a total of 2(n−k) possible column vectors, birthday bound requires the size of the lists l to
satisfy the bound l × l ≥ 2(n−k). Thus we need l ≥ 2(n−k)/2.
The above bound for l may still be large and it may be diﬃcult to prepare lists this long. In
such a case, we can extend the two list approach and prepare 4 or 8 or ...2t lists, and look for a
match among these lists by using Wagner’s tree-based approach [6]. The advantage of our method
is that it does not require any Gaussian to be performed. The cost of the algorithm is only in
the preparation and matching of the lists, hence a single iteration of our algorithm is likely to be
more eﬃcient than a single iteration of other algorithms. We plan to do analysis of the rate of
convergence of our algorithm later.
6. Results and Conclusions
We tested the algorithms of Leon, Stern and Canteaut-Chabaud on a code prepared by lineariz-
ing the 23-step SHA-256 hash function. In the linearization, all additions were replaced by XOR
and the non-linear 3-input boolean functions fIF and fMAJ were approximated by their middle
arguments. In the SHA-256 hash function, one block (512-bit) message is mapped to 8 registers of
32-bits each. Thus, its linearized version corresponds to a code having generator matrix of order
256×512. We tested the algorithms with improvements described in Sections 3 and 4. We found
that the algorithm by Canteaut and Chabaud gave the best results. In a code of size 512, the
method could produce a codeword of weight 79 which is detailed in hexadecimal in Table 1. We
are still implementing our new method described in Section 5.
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